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1. ABSTRACT
The dynamic charging technology will enable Electric 
Vehicles (EVs) to charge their batteries while moving. In 
order to provide secure and efficient charging services to EV 
the dynamic charging system should allow only authorized 
EVs to access the system and should ensure the payment 
integrity. In this paper, we propose an efficient scheme to 
secure the dynamic charging system and to preserve the 
privacy of the drivers. The scheme uses a combination of 
different cryptosystems to achieve security and privacy. 
Anonymous coins are used to ensure anonymous payment 
and authentication. Our analysis demonstrates that the 
proposed scheme is secure and can preserve privacy. In 
addition, our measurements confirm that the proposed 
scheme is efficient.
2. INTRODUCTION
• Electric vehicle (EV) is a vehicle that does not use any 
gasoline as source of energy. Instead, it is driven by an 
electric motor that uses a stored battery to provide 
electricity. It is a form of green transportation.
• However, one of the major challenges of EV deployment 
is the large time needed to charge battery and the 
maximum driving range. 
• Dynamic charging is a promising technology that can 
address this issue by enabling the EVs to charge while 
moving.
• In dynamic charging systems, charging pads are placed 
under a portion of roadbed and an EV’s battery is 
charged when the vehicle drives over the pads by using 
electromagnetic induction [1].
• The dynamic charging system should communicate with 
the EVs to only charge the authorized vehicles and 
ensure payment integrity. 
• However, this communication should be secured to 
avoid stealing energy by charging EVs without payment. 
Also, this communication should not leak sensitive 
information of EV drivers, especially location 
information.
• We mainly focus on the security and privacy issues, 
namely the authentication and traceability problem.
4. NETWORK MODEL
• As illustrated in Fig. 1, the considered 
network model has a bank, a charging 
station, and EVs. Each charging 
station has a charging station provider 
(CSP), road side units (RSUs), and 
Charging Pads.
• For the threat model, we focus on two 
main types of attacks against driver 
privacy and the payment. Attackers 
can be both internal and external.
• We have designed our network model 
in hierarchical architecture, so that we 
can easily manage the secret keys 
distribution among all the entities in 
the dynamic charging system.
• The proposed scheme should consider the characteristics 
of dynamic charging system
•Large number of charging pads [4]
•Limited computational resources
•Short Contact time between pads and EV
• So, by considering the above mentioned limitations the 
proposed scheme should use light weight cryptography 
to achieve fast authentication and some efficient 
cryptography tools to protect the privacy of users. 
5. PROPOSED SCHEME
• As illustrated in Fig. 1, the first phase in our scheme is purchasing anonymous coins shown in Fig.2 from the bank.
• When an EV needs to charge, it sends a coin to the CSP (Fig.3). The CSP needs to contact the bank to ensure that the 
coin has not been used before. The bank cannot link the coin to the EV that bought because of blind signature [2].
• Then, the CSP sends two secret tokens (one from Fig.4 and one from Fig.5) to enable the EV to compute shared 
secret keys with the RSUs as shown in Fig.6. Each RSU needs to store only one column from each matrix.
• Using these keys, the EV authenticates itself to each RSU to obtain a secret token to compute shared keys with the 
pads controlled by that RSU.
The proposed scheme can secure the payment while
offering full anonymity to EV drivers. We have also
proposed an efficient technique to compute and share a
large number of secret keys and our measurements proved
it. Our scheme is scalable.
In this scheme we have treated all the EVs similarly. In
future, we want to give priority levels to the EVs depending
upon the attributes of each EV such as a police vehicle,
ambulance or a government vehicle should get high priority
than the normal EVs.
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Fig 1: Network Model
Fig 5: Creating Token Matrix-2 b/w CS and RSU
Fig 2: Purchasing Coins Fig 3: Authentication at Charging Station
3. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
• We use two metrics, computation and communication 
overhead, to evaluate the performance of our scheme.
• In order to evaluate the computation overhead, we used 
Crypto++ 5.6.2 library [3] to measure the computation 
time of the cryptographic operations used in our scheme.
6. RESULTS
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
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Fig 4: Creating Token Matrix-1 b/w CS and RSU
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• The keys obtained from a RSU will be used to 
authenticate EV at pads under that RSU.
Fig 7: Charging flexibility according to Payment
Fig 6: Computing Shared keys with RSU by EVi
Entities Storage Overhead Computation Overhead 
E.V 
(nr × 20) + (np × 20) 
bytes 
0.167 𝝁sec + 0.125 𝝁sec 
 
Charging 
Pads 
n × 20 bytes 
(n -1) × (np -1) × 0.0418𝝁sec + 
0.0418 𝝁sec 
RSU n × 20 bytes 
2 × (n -1) × (nr  -1) × 0.0418𝝁sec 
+ 0.23 𝝁sec + 0.0418 𝝁sec 
CSP 2 × n × 20 bytes 
2 × (n -1) × (nr  -1) × 0.0418𝝁sec 
+ 0.23 𝝁sec 
 
• An EV can compute the shared keys with the RSUs by 
hashing the two tokens given by CS and then XORing
corresponding two elements, as illustrated in Fig. 6.
• Our scheme can be used to limit the number of RSUs’ pads 
an EV can charge from by limiting the number of keys the 
EV can calculate, as illustrated in Fig. 7.
• We use the same technique that is used between RSUs and 
CSP to enable the RSUs to share keys with the pads under 
their control, but by computing only one matrix by using 
γn,np as seed token.
